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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DILEMMA OF
JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING
EDWARD MCWIIINNEY*
To understand the philosophic conflicts in the United States
Supreme Court at the present day, one must first go back to the
dilemma bequeathed to the Court by its outstanding judicial personality of modem times, Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
on his retirement in 1932 after thirty years of service on the Court.
For Holmes' conception of the judicial function (or, at least, so it
seems in the light of re-examination at the present day) was essentially two-sided. First, there was a tradition of judicial restraint,
or more properly judicial self-restraint-the notion that the Supreme Court (in Holmes' words) should defer to the popular will as
expressed in the enactments of legislative majorities:
"unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law. '
-this even though the judges might personally consider the enactment in question unwise and unreasonable. From the viewpoint of
constitutional technology this judicial attitude is represented by the
judicial "presumption of constitutionality" of legislation. Second,
there was a tradition of judicial activism, involving the notion that
in certain areas of subject matter, notably the field of political and
civil rights, the Court should look with a jealous eye on legislation
cutting down or trenching on those rights; on the technological side,
this is represented by what amounts, in effect, to a judicial presumption of invalidity (or unconstitutionality).
The first strain, stemming originally from Holmes' classic dissent in the Lochner case in 1905, was an intellectual position reiterated by Holmes as a minority judge throughout his career on
the Supreme Court in opposition to what amounted to a politically
and economically Conservative majority on the Court which persisted in invalidating National and State social and economic planning legislation on the score of conflict with a liberty of contract
supposedly guaranteed by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the
Constitution. This Court majority-the "Old Court" as it is now
customary to call it-was (in the terminology of the present day)
attempting to maintain through judicial activism as applied to the
*LL.M., J.S.D., Barrister-at-law, Assistant Professor of Political
Science (Public Law), Yale University.
1. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion
by Mr. Justice -Holmes).
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Constitution an essentially laissez-faire organization for American
economic and social life.
Now the Holmes' opposition to the "Old Court" was always
expressed as a technical one-an objection in effect to judicial activism, in the name of the new doctrine of judicial self-restraint. The Old
Court majority, as is well known, finally yielded in 1937 under pressure of public opinion and a powerful Executive, President Franklin Roosevelt, who was roused to challenge the Court's outright rejection of the main planks of the New Deal legislation. The collapse
of the Old Court seems to have been due, essentially, to public reaction to the economic philosophy that the Court majority's decisions maintained; the opposition to the Old Court, however (especially in professional and academic legal circles), was verbalised in
terms of Separation of Powers arguments and conceptions of the
proper role of the Court vis-.-vis legislative majorities-in a word,
the Holmesian notion of judicial self-restraint. Thus, even in the
overthrow of the Old Court, something of the same ambivalence
that we have observed in the basic Holmesian approach to judicial
review seems to be present. On the one hand, there is opposition to
the Old Court on political or philosophical grounds, in terms of
objections to the particular policies that the reigning majority on the
Court is implementing; this type of opposition, however, necessarily
rests on the basic premise that the Court has the right (which it
should exercise), of passing on legislation-the objection is here
not to judicial activism as such but to the particular application of
judicial activism (maintenance of laissez-faire) actually being made
by the Old Court. On the other hand, there is the more technically
based opposition which insists that the Court has no function interfering with the enactments of -the legislature, whatever the nature
of those enactments-the Court should adopt a hands-off policy.
It may be, inthis connection, that legislative poyer will be abused
on individual occasions, but that is no argument against its existence.
"For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must
resort to the polls, not to the courts." 2
The defeat of the Old Court majority in 1937 was followed by
the rapid departure of its individual supporters from the Supreme
Court Bench. Within a space of iour years after 1937 only Mr. Justice
Roberts and Mr. Justice Stone (the latter, indeed, a consistent
judicial supporter of the New Deal programme) remained out of the
nine justices who had ruled on the legislative programme of Presi2. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134 (1876) (opinion of the Court

by Mr. Justice Waite).
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dent Franklin Roosevelt; and as these justices retired their seats
were filled by men who were known as supporters of the New Deal,
and who indeed had frequently led the fight for the adoption of the
Roosevelt programme in the political arena-Black and Byrnes as
Senators, and Reed, Douglas, Murphy, and Jackson as members of
the Roosevelt Administration. Even without the decisive slant given
to the Court by this flood of New Deal appointments, it was quite
apparent after the landslide victory of President Roosevelt in his bid
for re-election in 1936 and after the volte-face of the Old Court
majority in 1937 which followed so closely and so significantly on
that victory, that the New Deal had become accepted majority
opinion in the United States. However, the new majorities on the
Supreme Court after 1937 proceded to follow up the overturning
of the Old Court not merely by upholding the constitutionality of
individual pieces of New Deal social and economic planning legislation that were challenged before it, but by developing as it were a
general presumption of constitutionality in favor of enactments of
the National Legislature (Congress), whatever the subject matter
of those enactments. On only two occasions since 1937 have provisions of Congressional enactments been declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court and those cases presented rather special
examples of the user of national legislative power so as hardly to
constitute substantial exceptions to the general rule. The major
case, United States v. Lovett,3 involved a rider that had been tacked
on by Congress to a general appropriation bill as a rather devious
device for enforcing the dismissal by the Executive of three civil
servants who had been under investigation by a Congressional Committee; President Roosevelt faced with the choice in this situation
of either approving the whole bill, or else vetoing it as a whole and
so delaying essential wartime appropriations, adopted the former
course but noted on the Act his personal view that the rider was
"not only unwise and discriminatory, but unconstitutional;" it is
perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court was persuaded to
vary its rule in this case, and to step in and invalidate the rider as an
unconstitutional bill attainder. The remaining case4 is of quite
limited significance in so far as it has to do with a somewhat
infelicitously drafted evidential presumption provision in a Federal
Firearms Act.
Yet in spite of the impressive record of the Supreme Court since
1937 in upholding enactments of the National Legislature, it is true
3.

United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
4. Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 (1943).
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to say that the Court during that same period has been more marked
in its internal disagreements than any of its predecessors. This is
not the first time, of course, that there have been disagreements on
the Court. The Old Court before 1937 was, after all, in terms of the
subject matter for which its members voted, split two-ways, with a
conservative majority and a liberal minority. The difference between the Old Court and the New Court lies first of all in the nature
of the disagreements, with the present Court (as revealed in its
practice in opinion-writing) a Court not merely of frequent and
sometimes multiple dissenting opinions but of multiple and diverging
concurring (that is, majority) opinions too. Speaking metaphorically, an English-type two-party system on the Court before 1937 has
now given way to a French multiple-party system in the 1940's and
1950's. The second basic difference between the Old Court and the
New is in the area of subject matter in which the internal disagreements on the Court occur-where the Court before 1937
was concerned above all with rights of private property supposedly
guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court today is concerned with
the rights of man or personal liberty and the disagreements within the
New Court's ranks also mark differing degrees of judical tolerance
toward legislative and executive action on the part of the States
as distinct from the National Government. On the technical side,
the disagreement is reflected, in part at least, in a perpetuation of
the Holmesian dilemma-judicial self-restraint as opposed to currently revived claims of the need for a policy of judicial activism,
though this time with a rather different content than was the case
with the pre-1937 Court majority formula. This latter judicial position is most prominently identified today with Mr. justice Black and
Mr. Justice Douglas (and before their recent deaths, Justices
Murphy and Rutledge); it claims to derive from Holmes' position
as a Liberal judge-as a symbol (for present generations at least),
of Liberal thought in the United States. It would, to this extent,
identify Holmes' opposition to the Old Court majority less with his
technical challenge that the Old Court was usurping the functions of
the legislature and acting in effect as a "super-legislature," than
with a postulated objection by Holmes to the social and economic
values that the Old Court majority was actually implementing in its
decisions, the thesis that the Old Court majority was basing its
rulings, as Holmes so strikingly expressed it in his Lochner case
dissent, "upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain." 5 This latter conception of Holmes as a judicial
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75 (1905).
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activist, and in such capacity as the Liberal dissenter on a reactionary
Court, claims strength from Holmes' opinions in free speech cases,
including his enunciation of the famous "clear and present danger"
test as a means of balancing the constitutional guarantee of free
speech against countervailing claims of national security.6 It would
trace this Liberal tradition as seen to be established by Holmes,
also in the judicial opinions of his colleague and friend Brandeis, in
part too in the opinions of Mr. Justice Cardozo, and coming more
nearly to contemporary events in the opinions of Harlan Stone
who was first of all an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
in the period 1925-1941, and then Chief Justice in the crucial
period 1941-1946 when the internal conflicts on the New Court first
became marked. As applied by the two leading Liberals on the Court
today, Black and Douglas, judicial activism would imply that the
Court should assume a watch-dog role to ensure full compliance with
the letter and the spirit of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Not
merely will legislative action that impinges on the area of political
and civil rights be cut down and the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and religion, of fair criminal procedure, and of equal
rights for racial minorities be preserved against legislative invasion;
but the Court will take the initiative to ensure that the actual administration and application of National and State laws conforms
fully to the spirit of the Bill of Rights. So keen indeed is the scrutiny
which the two main activists of the present day, Black and Douglas,
apply to the administration of justice by the individual States that at
times it seems almost true to say that these judges pursue the States
sword in hand. As one further aspect of judicial activism today,
reference should be made to an important and distinctive contribution made by Chief Justice Stone to modern American constitutional
law. In a judicial opinion written by him in 1938, Stone suggested
by way of obiter dictum only (and indeed in the form of a footnote
to the opinion) 7 that perhaps there might be occasion for departing
from the normal presumption of constitutionality for legislation in
cases where the action in question by the legislature involved a restriction or curtailment of the ordinary political processes. For the
presumption of constitutionality is posited, after all, on the notion
that the legislature, and not the Court, represents the people-that is
majority will; and that the normal working of the political processes
can "ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal of undesirable
6. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S.47, 52 (1919) (opinion of
the Court by Mr. Justice Holmes).
7. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 n. 4

(1938).
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legislation." However, if the legislature, through, for example,
manipulation of the electrical laws or impeding of public discussion
prevents the political processes from operating freely, then the
essential premise from which the presumption of constitutionality
is derived-the notion of a representative majority-can hardly
be said to be present.
Stone's Political Process ccncept seemed to afford, for his own
purposes, something of a solution to the Holmesian dilemma-how
to reconcile deference to popular will as expressed through legislative majorities with the desire of judges from time to time to intervene to correct what they might choose to regard as legislative
abuses. The Political Process concept thus originated as a special
exception to the general judicial approach after 1937 of a presumption of constitutionality in favour of legislative action. As a
special category of exceptions, it is clear that the Political Process
concept would be somewhat limited in its area of potential application, covering essentially electoral matters and probably too questions of free speech-this latter notion however shading off into
the contemporary concept of the Free Speech guarantee in the
Constitution occupying a "preferred position."" Yet it represented
the first doctrinal challenge to the new judicial orthodoxy after 1937
-the presumption of constitutionality-and as such marked the
first formal step towards the development of judicial activism among
the members of the present Court. But the judicial activists of today
go beyond Stone's modest concept. The presumption of constitutionality may remain so far as enactments of the National Legislature
are concerned, but no more than this.9 Wherever issues of political
and civil rights are concerned, then laws passed by the State (as
distinct from the National) legislatures, the application and administration of those State laws, and even the administration of Na8. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 88 (1949) (opinion by Mr.
Justice Reed). But the "preferred position" concept of the Free Speech guarantee has been sharply criticised by Frankfurter, J.as a
"phrase that has uncritically crept into some recent opinions of this
Court. I deem it a mischievous phrase, if it carries the thought, which
it may subtly imply, that any law touching communication is infected
with presumptive invalidity." Id. at 90 (concurring opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter).
See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 539 (1951) (concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter) :
"Free speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are not
legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province."
9. Compare Holmes' remark:
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union
would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws
of the several States." Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 295-296 (1920).
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tional laws, will be subjected to the most rigorous judicial scrutiny.
The principal intellectual opposition to judicial activism on the
present Court is afforded by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter rests firmly on the first head of the Holmesian approach,
judicial self-restraint; and at the same time he challenges the claim
of the judicial activists that Holmes is their intellectual progenitor.
Being closest of all the members of the present Court in terms of
personal associations, to Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Frankfurter can perhaps claim to speak with some added authority on
the Master's inherent philosophic attitudes. But Frankfurter would
also buttress his denial of the judicial activists' link with Holmes by
recourse to the Holmes' decisions themselves; and indeed a careful
examination of Holmes' decisions in the free speech area at least,
would suggest that like his colleague Brandeis 0 his approach to
judicial review was characterized by a conscious and sustained rejection of judicial sentimentality, an intellectual attitude befitting a
sceptic and relativist (as the current Holmes-revisionist school
would imply is the case with Holmes, anyway), but certainly not
a liberal activist."
But Mr. Justice Frankfurter's approach to judicial review, with
its strong rejection of judicial activism, would claim to rest on more
substantial ground than the probings of the Holmes-revisionists
aimed at dispelling the "legend" of Holmes as the wearer of the
Liberal mantle on the Court. The main doctrinal justifications of
judicial self-restraint at the present day proceed from judicial
acknowledgment of major limitations to the effectiveness of the
Court's assuming any activist role. First is a limitation of expertise,
stemming from judicial awareness that judicial review is not always
a very efficient form of policy-making; judges, in terms of the
highly specialized and concentrated education in law and the training in professional practice that they have undergone, are in this
view manifestly not the best equipped persions for translating community values into constitutional policies, and the concept of judicial
notice anyway it is said, is hardly an adequate tool for the factfinding necessary to an informed policy choice. A realisation of the
limitations on effective judicial fact-finding in constitutional cases
gave rise directly to the so-called Brandeis Brief' 2 involving as that
10. Compare an evaluation of the judicial philosophy of Mr. Justice
Brandeis. See Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 66 et seq.

(1949).

11. See generally, Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfutrter, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 357, 358 (1949).
12. As first employed by Brandeis, as counsel, in Muller v. Oregon, 208

U. S.412 (1908).
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does the direct incorporation of social and economic facts into the
briefs presented to the Court by the parties; and no doubt the
marked tendency in recent years, in making appointments to the
Supreme Court Bench, to look for men of broad experience in
public life rather than technical lawyers can be explained in part
by the Executive's conclusion that informed policy-making requires
intellectual qualities transcending the boundaries of strict professional competence.
A second limitation, which might be characterised as a limitation of techniques, stems from the fact that any policy-making-role
of the Court must be expressed necessarily through the medium of
case-law decisions. Unlike other Courts exercising Judicial Review,
for example the Supreme Court of Canada, the Supreme Court of
the United States does not choose to render advisory opinions. It is
dependent, therefore, in its jurisdiction upon the existence of an
adversary proceeding. Though the artificialities of Court-defined
rules as to what is a real adversary proceeding-a case or controversy-have been somewhat ameliorated by the passage of the
Federal Declaratory Judgments Act of 1934, it is still true to say
that the jurisdiction of the Court in constitutional cases, being dependent on the whims of private litigants, turns on rather arbitrary,
casual factors of time and circumstance. As Mr. Justice Jackson has
so strikingly pointed out, the decision in the aftermath of the Great
Depression as to whether the United States Treasury had power
to lower the gold content of the dollar 13 was determined within the
confines of a suit between private parties over a few paltry dollars.",
And Mr. Justice Frankfurter has summed up the problem in a recent opinion:
"Courts are not equipped to pursue the paths for discovering
wise policy. A court is confined within the bounds of a particular
record, and it cannot even shape the record. Only fragments of
a social problem are seen through the narrow windows of a
litigation. Had we innate or acquired understanding of a social
problem in its entirety, we would not have at our disposal adequate means for constructive solution."' 5
It is patent that in comparison with the Legislature and the Executive, the Court lacks the flexibility in timing of announcement and
also application of rules essential to a really effective policy-making
role.' 6
13. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
14. See Jackson, The Struggle i or Judicial Supremacy 103 (1941).
15. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S.343, 365-366 (1948) (dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
16. The writer cannot accept Professor Freund's contention that the
power of the Canadian Supreme Court to render Advisory Opinions and also
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A third limitation may be labeled a limitation of prestige. If the
Court essays an activist role it cannot avoid taking sides in the
political conflicts of the age. The end product of this must be to
embroil the Court in undignified partisan controversy, and there
may be a risk too, as happened with the Old Court majority before
1937, of the Court itself going down with a lost political cause.
"In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are
readily attributed to legislative conduct and as1 readily
believed.
7
Courts are not the place for such controversies. 1
But there are further and perhaps more basic objections to the
Court's assuming a policy-making role. The so-called limitation of
democracy accords with the first strain of the Holmesian conception
of the judicial function. It contends that majority rule is denied in
principle by judicial review, for in application judicial review means
ultimately the imposition of the will of the "nine old men" on the
prime representatives of the people, the legislature; the situation
tends to arise inevitably, then, as indeed was the case up to the
Court Revolution of 1937, that those who are no longer able to
control the legislature look to the Courts to preserve their special
interests. In counter to these contentions it may be pointed out, of
course, that the supremacy of legislative majorities, unchallenged
by the Courts, may itself deny democracy, especially where a
transient legislative majority should seek to perpetuate itself by
manipulation of the machinery of government established for the
effectuation and determining of popular will, for example the laws
governing the procedure and conduct of elections. This is a restatement of Stone's Political Process concept, of course, but it is
to be noted that the Court has been notoriously inactive in this area
of subject matter in recent years, justifying its general non-intervention to correct abuses in the electoral system on the affirmative
ground that these are "political" questions properly outside the
range of competence of the Court-the doctrine of political questions.' 8 Again, and especially in a federal system as with the United
States, it may be a question of which popular will, or more precisely
which legislative majority, is to be deferred to. What if the majority
will, as expressed in a particular State or States, runs counter to
the comparative readiness of the High Court of Australia to concede standing to sue in constitutional cases, have any significant bearing on the relative
abstractness of Canadian and Australian constitutional decisions. See Freund,
A Supreme Court in a Federation:Some Lesson's from Legal History, 53
Col. L. Rev. 597, 613 (1953).
17. Tenney v. Brandbove, 341 U. S. 367, 378 (1951) (opinion of the
Court by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
18. See , - outh v. Peters, 339 U. S. 276 (1950) ; Colegrove v. Green,
328 U. S.549 (1946).
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over-all National will, as for example the judicial activists might
say is the case in respect to civil rights, matters of public morality,
and especially race relations questions? In such instances quite apart
from any question of the merits of the State action involved, it may
be a matter of cutting down the State legislative action in question
in deference to considerations of over-riding National policy. The
answer to this type of problem, of course, may be bound up also with
one's essential approach to Federal government. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for example, would appear to base his general inclination to
defer to the State legislative action in these cases as much or more
on Federalist considerations of the need for a balancing of National
legislative powers by State-Rights claims' 9 as on the more general
notion of the desirability of judicial self-restraint vis-a-vis legislative majorities (whether National or State).
One final limitation has been suggested to the effectiveness of
any policy of judicial activism on the part of the Supreme Court
judges. Closely linked as it is to the limitation of democracy already
referred to, we may perhaps identify it, for want of a better term,
as a sociological limitation, being based on a judicial recognition of
the socio-ethical limitations to the effectiveness of any legal action.
This view, which has undertones of Mr. Justice Holmes and also of
Judge Learned Hand,20 is once again closely associated with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, and as expressed by him in the course of his
writings and his legal opinions amounts to an attempted rebuttal
to the judicial activists. Its central theme is the idea that a people
must make their own salvation and not expect it to be served up to
them by the judges:
"Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for
discouraging or correcting... abuses." 2'
It is to be noted that this approach manifests something of a distrust in fundamental law guarantees and written Constitutions, at
least where these are not rooted in general community attitudes:
"It is highly significant that not a single constitution framed for
English-speaking countries since the Fourteenth Amendment
19. See generally, Jaffe, supra note 11, at 381 et seq. It is to be noted,
however, that in the recent public school segregation decision, Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), Mr. Justice Frankfurter was
prepared to abandon his usual deference to State action to be part of a
unanimous Court ruling (against the arguments of the States of Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware), that segregation in public education violated the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.
20. See generally, The Spirit of Liberty, Papers and Addresses by
Learned Hand (Dilliard ed. 1953). See also Calm, Authority and Responsibility, 51 Col. L. Rev. 838 (1951).
21. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 378 (1951) (opinion of
the Court by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
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has embodied its provisions. And one would indeed be lacking
in a sense of humour to suggest that life, liberty or property
is not
22
amply protected in Canada, Australia, South Africa."
It is also an attitude strongly reminiscent of the writings of the
great English constitutional lawyer, Professor A. V. Dicey, which
reveal consistently a marked distaste for the paper Constitutions of
Continental Europe together with a belief that the best guarantee of
personal liberties is the self-restraint of legislative majorities operating in a Sovereign, legally uncontrolled Parliament, as in the
United Kingdom.2 3 This is not the only example of an English influence in Frankfurter's approach. His approach to the States,
which we have already examined, with its consciously Federalist
impulse, bespeaks a conviction, which had undertones of his close
friend Laski's liberal pluralism, as well, of course, (and more
obviously) of Jeffersonian Democracy, that in territorial dispersion
of authority lies the best insurance of group autonomy and the
maintenance of personal liberty. Frankfurter's own personal background as, in his own words, "[o]ne who belongs to the most
vilified and persecuted minority in history ..
-24 must make him
alive to the merits of a pluralist approach to governmental organisation, even though he may not always appear consistent in applying
such a principle.2 5 And dominating everything is Frankfurter's belief that American pre-occupation with questions of legality involves
the equation of constitutionality with morality and the destruction
of any sense of popular responsibility for the Constitution and its
working:
"It must never be forgotten that our constant preoccupation
with the constitutionality of legislation rather than its wisdom
tends to preoccupation of the the American mind with a false
value.., the tendency of focusing attention on constitutionality
is to make constitutionality synonymous with propriety; to regard a law as all right so long as it is 'constitutional.' Such an
attitude is a great enemy of liberalism.... Only a persistent positive translation of the liberal faith into the thoughts and acts of
22. The Red Terror of Judicial Reform (Editorial), 40 New Republic
110, 113 (October 1, 1924). See also Law and Politics 16 (MacLeish ed.
1939). There is perhaps today a certain irony in the reference to South
Africa-see McWhinney, Race Relations and the Courts in the Union of
South Africa, 32 Can. B. Rev. 44 (1954).
23. See, for example, Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (1885);
Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century
(2d ed. 1914). It is clear that Mr. Justice Frankfurter is well acquainted
with Dicey's writings--compare Law and Politics 7 (MacLeish ed. 1939).
24. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
624, 646 (1943) (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter). These are
the opening words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion.
25. See, e.g., ibid.
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the community is the real reliance against
the unabated tempta28

tion to straitjacket the human mind.1

The Frankfurterian rebuttal to the judicial activists rests, as we
have stated, on the notion of judicial self-restraint. It does not involve however, in Frankfurter's case, a mere mechanical application of the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments.
Judicial self-restraint, according to Frankfurter, is predicated on the
rule of reason - unless the Court can say that reasonable men could
not possibly have passed the legislation in question, the Court irrespective of its own views on the legislation, must uphold it. In
respect to national legislation, Frankfurter has gone along with his
colleagues on the Court in over-ruling challenges to the legislation.
In respect to State legislation, the problem as Frankfurter sees it is
a rather different one - how to apply the rule of reason criterion in
individual cases without yielding to purely subjective considerations
and thus falling backwards into judicial activism. To eliminate the
subjective elements from judicial decision-making Frankfurter resorts at times to proceduralisms and purports to rest his decision on
technical rules; more frequently he seems to base his hopes for
objective certainty on what woud amount to the formulae for legal
relativism. To determine such matters as whether a State can, consistently with the First Amendment free speech guarantee, ban
motion pictures on the score of "sacrilege," he resorts to history,
lexicographic and general ;27 to determine whether a State may,
consistently with Due Process of Law as guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution, utilise in a criminal prosecution
evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure, he turns to
comparative law and makes a survey of practice in the forty-eight
States and also in "the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of Nations" ;28 or he may look for the meaning of Due
Process of Law, as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, in the
"canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice
of English-speaking peoples... ."29 The difficulty with all these tests
26. Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration (Editorial), 43 New
Republic 85, 86-87 (June 17, 1925). See also Law and Politics 197 (MacLeish ed. 1939). These remarks are substantially repeated by Frankfurter, J.
in his specially concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494,
555-556 (1951), though without any formal acknowledgment of their original source in the New Republic Editorial.
27. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 507 (1952) (concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
28. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.25, 29-30, 39 (Appendbc to opinion,
Table J.) (1949) (opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
29. See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 (1947) (concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
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seems clear. "History", as the Adanson Case indicates, 30 may yield
different answers to different judges or may be otherwise quite inconclusive as the examination of the background history of the 14th
Amendment in the recent public school segregation cases clearly
showed.", Recourse to comparative law in search of examples to be
applied by American judges, apart from the risk that the examples
taken may be selective rather than representative, demands first a
demonstration of a certain identity of political, social, and economic
conditions before the examples from comparative law can really be
regarded as relevant to American experience. Frankfurter seems to
assume too easily such an identity of political, social and economic
conditions on the part of the United States and the "Englishspeaking" world; though for one who is acquainted, as he is, with
Dean Roscoe Pound's teachings, this is hardly sound sociological
jurisprudence.3 2 It may be, rather, that by virtue of the homogeneity
30. Adamson v. California, supra. Note the conflict manifested in the
opinions of Frankfurter, J., concurring specially at p. 59; and of Black, J.,
dissenting at p. 68. See also the detailed historical Appendix attached by
Black, J. to his opinion. Id. at 92-123.
31. See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, 489-490
(1954) (opinion of the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Warren) :
"Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868). It covered exhaustively
consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states,
then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents
and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not
enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they
are inconclusive....
"An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's
history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time (footnote omitted). In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet
taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of
private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate .... As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education."
32. See, e.g., Pound, Social Control Through Law (1942). Professor
Cahn has commented pungently on this same tendency in Supreme Court
and Supreme Law 63 (Cahn ed. 1954) :
"It may appear to you as somewhat peculiar that, in a country which contains such a high proportion of individuals who do not share AngloSaxon origins, the only history regarded as relevant, not merely for
the purpose of defining specific terms like 'jury' but likewise for the
purpose of defining basic national traditions, should be Anglo-Saxon
history. It is assumed that the Volksgeist the Supreme Court is supposed
to consult is Anglo-Saxon."
33. Compare in this regard Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reliance in his
dissenting opinion in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S.343, 356 (1948), on the
practice of "the English-speaking world" and also on a "consensus of
opinion among English-speaking courts the world over" as to the "domicile"
necessary to base jurisdiction in divorce proceedings, as authority for the
State of Massachusetts' refusal to accord "full faith and credit" in -terms of the
Constitution to a divorce decree granted by a Court in the State of Florida.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:837

of their racial and social composition, the "English-speaking"
countries (apparently the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth
Countries), have frequently much less meaningful lessons to offer
the United States than other countries which may more nearly approach the United States' cultural diversity. 33 And what, for example, of the "canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples" and for that matter,
of the "concept of ordered liberty" ?34 Concepts such as these, indeed,
are so vaguely and loosely worded as to allow almost any content to
be poured into them.35 It seems almost that Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
in questing after absolute purity from subjective factors, has left the
door open for what Holmes himself has called the "inarticulate
major premise. '38 Judicial self-restraint insofar as, in the application
of the rule of reason, it involves the resort to legal relativism, seems
to run the risk of too frequently reducing to an unconscious and
therefore (since the weighing of policy alternatives requisite to an
informed decision is necessarily absent) rather inefficient form of
policy-making.
We have seen that the philosophic division in terms of judicial
self-restraint versus judicial activism on the present Court stems
from the Holmesian dilemma bequeathed to the Court in the 1930's.
The emotional intensity of the division has been heightened during
the Cold War period - for the current crisis, in multiplying the
occasions for the Court's being called on to balance constitutional
guarantees of free speech with considerations of national security,
increases, on the one hand, the demands of the judicial activists that
the Court should step in to preserve Constitutional liberties, and on
the other hand, the arguments of the advocates of self-restraint (the
judicial passivists, as we may now call them) that the delicate
balancing of interests involved in these cases is properly conducted
by the legislature, and that the Court must not interfere with the
legislature's resolution of the conflict. The dilemma is by no means
yet resolved though since the deaths of Murphy and Rutledge have
reduced the ranks of the avowed activists on the Court to only two
(Black and Douglas), out of a total of nine justices, the balance on
34. The phrase seems to have been first used by Cardozo, J.for the
Court, in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) ; it was adopted
by Frankfurter, J., for the Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 169

(1952).

35. Stone, The Province and Function of Law 185 et seq. (1946), classifies judicial concepts such as these under "The Legal Category of Indeterminate Reference."
36. The phrase stems from Mr.Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45. 74 (1905).
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the Court must be regarded as having been tilted rather strongly
now towards the passivists. Yet the judicial scales have oscillated violently before this. Judicial self-restraint was a reaction, after all,
to a strong Court before 1937 that many people felt had overstepped
the limits of wisdom and discretion. The presumption of constitutionality applied by the New Court after 1937 to National legislation
was for practical purposes, a switch from a strong Court (in National matters, that is) to a strong Executive or President, the
legislative programmes in question all being, of course, sponsored
and initiated ultimately by the Executive (President Roosevelt).
Now the recent Steel Case3 7 has seen both the activists and the
passivists on the Court united against the conception of a strong
Executive 8 and throwing the weight of the Court toward a strong
legislature (Congress), as the end of the cycle of the last generation
-from strong Court to strong President to strong Congress. The
difference this time is that in the Steel Case the activists and the
passivists each voiced their objections to President Truman's seizure
action in terms of balance of powers arguments officially subsumed
under the constitutional principle of separation of powers between
the various arms of government. It is possible in this regard to
speculate that we are now to have a new pragmatic solution to
problems of the relationship inter se of the three main arms of
government, in the Cold War period, in terms of a neo-Montesquieuan conception of an avoiding of concentration of a totality or
preponderance of constitutional powers in any one set of hands as
the means of preserving a liberal democratic society. Does this mean
that both judicial self-restraint and judicial activism have by this
time served their purpose as rationalisations of differing judicial
conceptions of the proper role of Courts in exercising judicial review? The strikingly novel agreement that the judges have shown
in the recent public school segregation decision, 39 not merely in
returning a unanimous vote on the general principle of ending
segregation in public education, but also in refraining from their
privilege of writing individual opinions and instead adherng as one
to Chief Justice Warren's Opinion of the Court, at least suggests
that the polar extremes of doctrinal attitudes among the various
judges that characterised the Stone and the Vinson Courts, will be
maintained much less dogmatically in the future.
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952).

38. Compare, for example, the opinions of Black, J., id. at 582 (opinion
of the Court) ; Frankfurter, J ., id. at 593 (concurring opinion) ; Douglas, J.,
id. at 629 (concurring opinion).
39. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

